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I.

INTRODUCTION

Turkey's bid for full membership in the European Union (EU)
has been a major source of controversy for the international
community. The possibility of Turkish accession has fueled discussion
about the changing character of the EU and the potentially far-reaching
economic consequences of allowing additional member states.2
International proponents of Turkish accession cite to Turkey as being a
key to regional power, 3 while Turkish proponents cite Turkey's
1 Turkey's Quest for EU Membership, EU Briefings 1 (Mar. 2008), available at
http://europe.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Brief4-0803-turkeys-quest.pdf.
2 Anna Williams, Has the Moment for Turkish Accession
Passed?, European Union
Center Policy Brief, 4 (Summer 2014).
3 Bruce Kuniholm, Turkey's Accession to the European Union: Diferences in European
and US Attitudes, and Challengesfor Turkey. 2 Turkish Studies 1, 25, 34 (2001).
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European heritage and the potential economic advantages of accession.4
International opponents reference broad cultural differences between
Turkey and Western Europe5 and the ongoing Turkey-Cyprus conflict.6
Turkish opponents to accession mention how poorly the process has
been handled thus far. 7 Turkish accession would potentially have
policy consequences worldwide, 8 and now that President Erdogan has
made significant attempts to consolidate power 9 the question of Turkish
accession to the EU has never been more relevant.
Section II of this paper will provide a brief history of the
relationship between Turkey and the EU to illustrate the conflict's
evolution. Section III will discuss Turkish relations with several
important international players: first, the relationship between Turkey
and Germany, because Germany has been a major source of continued
opposition to Turkey's accession; then the continued Turkish-Cyprus
conflict, one of Turkey's greatest barriers to membership; and finally,
how the United States views Turkey's bid to join the EU, as the United
States' political perspectives present a stark contrast to the views of
most of the EU member states. Section IV will examine the state of civil
rights in Turkey in the context of the Turkish Constitution, which will
illustrate "problem areas" for the government that will need to be
addressed if Turkey wants to be seriously considered for accession into
the EU. This article concludes that until Turkey is able to remedy the
ongoing conflict with Cyprus, and addresses several of its human rights
concerns, Turkey is unlikely to gain membership into the EU.

4 Julianne

Smith, Turkey and Europe

A Widening Gap? in TURKEY'S EVOLVING
U.S.-TURKEY RELATIONS 19, 19 (Stephen J.
Flanagan & Samuel Braimen, eds., 1999).
DYNAMIcS: STRATEGIC CHOICES FOR
5Id.
6Williams,

supra, note 2, at 2.

Smith, supra note 4.

Constantinos Koliopoulos, The Strategic Implications of Turkey's EU Membership in

8

TURKEY-EUROPEAN UNION RELATIONS: DILEMMAS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND CONSTRAINTS

93, 107 (Meltem Mtiftiiler-Bac, Yannis A. Stivachtis eds., 2008).
9 Williams, supra note 2, at 5.
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HISTORY

Turkey made its first bid to join the European Economic
Community ("EEC") in July 1959,10 in order to gain the economic
advantages of belonging to a trade bloc.11 In response, the EEC agreed
to forge a loose association between itself and Turkey. 12 The resulting
negotiations produced the Agreement Creating An Association
Between The Republic of Turkey and the EEC ("Ankara Agreement"),
which came into effect in 1964.13 The long-term goal of this agreement
was full integration of Turkey into the EEC.14 The Ankara Agreement
stated that Turkey was to create a customs union,15 and in return the
EEC was to offer its financial assistance. 16 The Ankara Agreement did
not allow Turkey to be a part of the decision-making process in the
EEC.17
The Additional Protocol, another agreement between the EEC
and Turkey passed in 1970,18 provided that the EEC would abolish
tariffs and quantitative barriers with Turkey, and that Turkey would do
the same on a timetable of 12 to 22 years. 19 The Additional Protocol
would have also aligned Turkish economic legislation with the policies
of the EEC,20 however, it was never fully implemented. 21
In 1980, Turkey began experiencing economic difficulties and
underwent a military coup. 2 2 As a result of the civil rights violations

Enlargement-Turkey, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (June 11, 2013), http://
ec.europa.eu/enargement/countfies/detailed-country-information/turkey/index en.htm.
1 Q & A: Turkey and the EU, BBC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2004), http://news.
10

bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3682828.stm.
12 History of Turkey-EU Relations, TURKEY: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar. 6,

2007), http://www.abgs.gov.tr/index.php?p= 111&1=2.
13 id.
1

Id.
id.
1
6 Id.
17
id.
18
Id.
4

15

19 Sarah Fox Ozkan, Turkish-EU Relations and the Prospectsfor Turkish Accession, 13

LBJ J. PUB. AFF. 43, 45 (2001).

20 History of Turkey-EU Relations, supra note
21

12.

Id.

22 Dinesh Banani, Reforming History: Turkey's Legal Regime and its
Potential
Accession to the European Union, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 113, 116 (2003).
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associated with this coup, the EEC froze relations with Turkey. 23 In
response, Turkey both loosened restraints on free trade 24 and allowed
multiparty elections. 25 Relations between Turkey and the EEC were
restored by 1983.26
Turkey first applied for formal membership in the EEC in
1987.27 The Commission issued an opinion in 1989 saying that Turkey
was eligible for full membership in the EEC, but that the current
political climate was still unripe for Turkey's admission. 28 Soon
afterward, the European Parliament issued a statement of its intention
to slow relations with Turkey due to the Turkish government's human
rights violations and Turkey's ongoing political struggle with Greece
and Cyprus.29 The European Parliament then passed a resolution to
block any funding from the EU to Turkey, unless the funding fostered
democracy, human rights and civil society.30
The EU issued a statement saying that Turkey's customs union
was still non-compliant with many of the EU's recommendations 31
though Turkey eventually completed the process of compliance. 32
Another meeting ensued and the EU made a declaration on financial
cooperation with Turkey.33 This declaration also provided Turkey with
2.2 billion ECU (European Currency Units) to relieve some of the
hardship associated with opening up Turkey to additional competition
from other members of the EU, as well as improving Turkey's
infrastructure. 34 In 2004, constitutional amendments and penal reform
led the EEC to conclude that the EU should open accession negotiations

23 History of Turkey-EU Relations, supra note
12.
24

d.
d.
26
d.
27
d.
28
d.
29 Banani, supra note 22, at 117.
30
d.
25

31 History of Turkey-EU Relations, supra note 12.
32

d.
Id.
34
d.
33
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to Turkey.35 That same year, the Brussels European Counsel followed
the EEC's recommendations. 36
In 2005, the EU began a screening process to determine the
degree to which Turkey still had to comply with any additional
remaining requirements for full membership.37 Currently, there are
thirteen areas (or "chapters") that are still open for negotiation: free
movement of capital, company law, intellectual property law,
information society and media, food safety, veterinary & phytosanitary
policy, taxation, statistics, enterprise & industrial policy, transEuropean networks, environment, consumer & health protection and
financial control.38 Only one area remains provisionally closed to
negotiation: science and research. 39
In 2006, however, the EU expressed concern over the free
movement of goods in the country. 40 Turkey had agreed to the free
movement of goods in the Additional Protocol.4 1 Shortly thereafter, the

EU stalled negotiations with Turkey on eight chapters due to Turkey's
hostilities with Cyprus. 42 Three chapters may be opened for negotiation
when Turkey fulfills only technical criteria. 43
In February 2013, Turkey's chief negotiator stated that it was
time for the EU to finally make a decision as to whether Turkey should
be allowed full membership. 44 Several policy issues remain in limbo
because of Turkey's refusal to recognize the sovereignty of Cyprus, a
member of the EU. 45 Turkey has recently expressed its continuing
interest in joining the EU although it has cited its citizens' skepticism of
35
36

d.
d.

37 Detailed Country Information-Turkey, EUROPEAN COMMISSION
PM); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 10.
38
39
40

41
42

(Sept. 5, 2014, 7:02

d.
d.
d.
Williams, supra note 2, at 1.

d.

43 Accession Negotiations-What is the current status?, DELEGATION OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION TO TURKEY (September 15, 2014, 6:17 PM), http://www.avmpa.info.tr/

en/turkey-the-eu/accession-negotioations/what-is-the-current-status.html.
Mohammad Abbas, Frustrated Turkey still wants EU entry, but maybe not euro,
REUTERS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/13/us-britainturkey-eu-idUSBRE91CIE520130213.
45
d.
44

U. MIAMI INT'L & CoMP. L. REV

24

V 22
V.

the status of the Euro as a potential reason for not adopting it as
currency. 46 Whether Turkey and the European Union will be able to
come to an agreement regarding Turkey's relations with Cyprus and
Turkey's human rights violations remains to be seen.
III.

KEY INTERNATIONAL PLAYERS TO TURKISH ACCESSION

Turkey's largest opposition to full membership in the EU has
arguably come from the Republic of Cyprus, France and Germany.47
Cyprus' opposition to Turkey becoming a member of the EU stems
from Turkey's refusal to recognize Cyprus as a country. 48 Former Prime
Minister of France, Nicolas Sarcozy, vehemently opposed the admission
of Turkey to the EU, publically saying, "I want to say that Europe must
give itself borders, that not all countries have a vocation to become
members of Europe, beginning with Turkey, which has no place inside
the European Union," and "[e]nlarging Europe with no limit risks
destroying European political union, and that I do not accept." 49
Recently, however, France has come out in support of continuing
negotiation for Turkey entering into the EU.50
A.

Germany-Turkey Relations

Angela Merkel, the current Chancellor of Germany, has
advocated a "vaguely defined partnership" between the EU and
Turkey, though Chancellor Merkel and many conservative voters in
Germany do not want Turkey to gain full membership.5 1 The current
Turkish prime minister responded that he would reject such an offer
and would accept nothing less than full membership. 52 Merkel has
4

6
7

4

id.
Id.

Mark Mardell, Turkey's EU membership bid stalls, BBC NEWS (Dec.
11, 2006),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6170749.stm.
48

49 Lucia Kubosova, Sarkozy launches presidential bid with anti-Turkey stance,

EUOBSERVER (Jan. 15, 2007), http://euobserver.com/political/23251.
50 Valentina Pop, France ready to unblock EU-Turkey talks, EUOBSERVER (Feb. 13,
2013), http://euobserver.com/enlargement/119044.
5i Id; Turkey Ready to Step up European Union Entry Talks, KYIvPOST

(June 30, 2009,
7:59 PM), https.//www.kyivpost.con/content/world/turkey-ready-to-step-up-europeanunion-entry-talks-44354.html.
52
d.
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previously expressed skepticism as to the idea that the EU should be
expanded.5 3
The primary point of contention between the two countries
seems to be the fact that Turkey will not open its ports to ships from
Cyprus. 54 In response to Merkel's demand that Turkey cede control of
its ports, Turkey demanded that the EU lift its embargo on the
controlled part of Cyprus in return.55 These problems have been
compounded by Merkel's recent public criticism that the Turkish
reaction to protests of Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Edrogan
were "too harsh."5 6 Apparently, Germany has blocked any further
accession talks in the EU, although now the parties have reached an
apparent compromise: negotiations will resume when Turkey issues a
progress report in October.5 7
Though Germany refers to Cyprus and the response to protests
as being the reasons why it favors less than full accession for Turkey,
other factors which have not been discussed publicly may also have an
effect. For example, free labor mobility could mean that the Turkish
immigrant population in Germany may increase from 2 to 3.5 million in
thirty years.58 Today, Germany has a Turkish population of about 2.1
million.59 The higher income available in Germany has already caused a
great deal of Turkish immigration into Germany since the 1960's, and
the free mobility of labor might mean that Turkish immigration into

53 Mark Beunderman, Merkel warns Turkey on 'very, very serious situation,'
EUOBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2006), http://euobserver.com/enlargement/22793.
5
4 Id.
55

id.

56

Damien McElroy, Angela Merkel hits out at 'harsh' response to Turkey protests,

(June
17,
2013,
6:38
PM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/worldnews/europe/turkey/10125814/Angela-Merkel-hits-out-at-harsh-responseto-Turkey-protests.html.
Laurence Norman, Germany Said to Block EU-Turkey Accession Talks, WALL ST. J.,
(June
20,
2013),
http://online.wsj.comnews/articles/SB10001424127887
323393804578557852712523268; Turkish Talks to Continue Despite Berlin Tiff,
SPIEGEL ONLINE (June 25,
2013, 1:32 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/
international/europe/turkey-and-eu-reach-compromise-on-accession-talks-a907723.html.
Harry Flam, Turkey and the EU: Politics and Economics of Accession, 50 CESinfo
Economic Studies 171-210, 186 (2004).
59
Id. at 179.
TELEGRAPH,
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Germany will only increase.60 Some Germans feel that an increase in
Turkish immigration could mean fewer available jobs.61 Because

German employers would have a greater base of workers from which
to choose, some have projected that a greater influx of Turkish
immigrants into Germany could mean reduced wages. 62
B.

Cyprus-Turkey Relations

Cyprus has been another major barrier to Turkey's accession to
the European Union.63 Turkey still flatly refuses to recognize the
Republic of Cyprus as an independent country. 64 Part of the present
dispute over Cyprus stems from the historical animosity between
Greece and Turkey.65 Greece and Turkey were involved in several wars
between the years of 1892 to 1922.66 The Greeks have historically been
leery of trusting the Turks because of Turkish behavior during Ottoman
rule, and the Turks mistrust the Greeks due to the Greeks' former
dream of uniting all former Greek territories. 67
Since 1974, the Turkish and Greek citizens of Cyprus have been
divided.68 In that year, the island was partitioned, with the northern
third of the island inhabited by the Turkish Cypriots and the southern
two-thirds inhabited by the Greek Cypriots. 69 The Buffer Zone between
these two areas is patrolled by United Nations troops. 70 The UN drew
up the dividing line after a ceasefire between the sections of the island
in 1963.71

In 1983, the Turkish portion of Cyprus declared its
independence and renamed itself the Turkish Republic of Northern
60

Id. at 180.

61
62 Id.

id.

63

at 179.

Cyprus Profile, BBC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-

617217956.
4
65

Id.
George Kaloudis, Cyprus: The Enduring Conflict, 16 INT'L J. ON WORLD PEACE 3-18

(1999).
66

67

Id. at 4.
Id.

68
69 Cyrpus Profile, supra note 63.
70
71

Id.
Id.

Id.
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Cyprus (TRNC). 72 The independence of the TRNC is only recognized
by Turkey.73 Although Cyprus has been a member of the UN since
2002, it continues to be divided.74 In 2003, the Turkish and Greek
portions of Cyprus failed to agree to the UN's plan of peace talks.75
Hopes of reunification of the island arose in 2008, with the ascension to
power of Mehmet Ali Talat, a left wing Turkish Cypriot leader. 76
However, these hopes were dashed when Turkish nationalists once
again gained power shortly thereafter. 7
As a result of the failure of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to agree
on what belongs to whom, Turkey has incurred a significant cost.78 In
the past, Turkey has lost its EU aid as a result of the conflict.79 Now, half
of Turkish negotiations with the EU have arguably stalled.80
In addition to the current dispute, territorial conflicts are
ongoing between these parties.81 In the Aegean, Turkish officials
apparently are aware that the Greeks have a much stronger claim to the
area.82 Similarly, in the Mediterranean, Greek officials apparently know
that Turkey has a much stronger claim.83 However, the major point of
contention appears to be Cyprus, especially since prior to the Cyprus
conflict Greece and Turkey had politically and commercially
normalized relations. 84
In practice, Greek Cypriots have represented Cyprus in the
EU.85 However, the recent economic recession has increased hopes that
7

2 id.
73 Id.
74 Cyrpus Profile, supra note 63.
75

Id.
id.
77
Id.
7

6

78 Hugh Pope, The Cost ofFrozen Conflictfor Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, INT'L CRISIS
GROUP
(2013),
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/opeds/Hugh-Pope-The-cost-of-frozen-conflict-for-Cyprus-Greece-and-Turkey.aspx.
79
Id.
80

Id.

81 Id.
8

2 Id.

83
8

d.

4 Id.

George Kyris, Cyprus's Economic Woes Could Help Resolve the Island'sDispute, TI

GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/mar/28/cyprus-economic-woe-resolve-conflict.
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Cyprus and Turkey could finally set aside their differences. 86 Cyprus
has sought a bailout from the EU, and decided to commence gas
exploration in the area in an attempt to reboot its economy.87 Turkey
has stated that any gas exploration in the area should be discussed with
the Greek and Turkish Cypriots.88 Although Turkey recently called for
fresh talks for the negotiation of the Cyprus issue, any resolution in the
immediate future is still unclear and progress in the matter is sure to
move slowly. 89

If Turkey wishes to resolve this issue, any discussion should
probably involve the Turkish Cypriots. One potential solution is to
simply give the Turkish Cypriots a larger voice in Cyprus's foreign
relations. Should the Turkish Cypriots finally feel included in the
Cypriot political discussion, they would feel Turkey's involvement
would no longer be necessary. Another potential solution might be a
confederacy-type government in Cyprus, in which Turkish Cypriots
maintain a distinct political identity but would still have to comply with
the laws of Cyprus's federal government. This compromise would
allow the Turkish Cypriots to be relevant in political discussions, while
at the same time form part of a united Cyprus. It is unlikely Turkey and
the Greek Cypriots would see either of these alternatives as within their
political interests, but both governments would have to make
concessions in order to finally resolve this quagmire. Until then, the
prospect of Turkish accession to the EU seems unlikely.
C.

United States-Turkey Relations

The United States does not factor directly into the accession of
Turkey into the European Union. However, the administrations of
George W. Bush and Barack Obama have both supported the
enlargement of the EU, and Turkey in particular has always been
strategically important. 90 Turkey's accession into the EU could possibly
aid foreign relations and economic opportunities for the United States

86

Id.

87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
88

90 Vincent Morelli, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22517, European Union Enlargement:A

Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations 16-17 (2013).

TURKISH ACCESSION TO THE EU

2014

29

in the region.91 President Barack Obama has recently reaffirmed this
position to the Arab world.92 In 2009, in his remarks before the Turkish
Parliament, President Obama said:
Turkey has been a resolute ally and a responsible partner in
transatlantic and European institutions. Turkey is bound to
Europe by more than the bridges over the Bosphorous.
Centuries of shared history, culture, and commerce bring
you together. Europe gains by the diversity of ethnicity,
tradition and faith -- it is not diminished by it. And Turkish
membership would broaden and strengthen Europe's
foundation once more. 93
The United States believes that Turkey's membership in NATO
indicates it should be able to cooperate with other countries in the EU,
since many countries in NATO are also in the EU. 94 However, the
United States has been disappointed since it has not been able to use its
influence successfully in order to expedite Turkey's accession. 95
Perhaps one of the biggest reasons the United States has been
so open about its support towards Turkey's accession into the EU is its
strategic placement in the Middle East. 96 First, Turkey shares its borders
with Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and therefore offers an ideal location for
airbases in the event of international conflict. 97 Second, Turkey's
alliance with Israel proves favorable since Israel is a key ally to the
United States.98 The United States also sees Turkey as a secular
democratic model for the surrounding region.99 Finally, Turkey gives
NATO access to a crucial region in the world, which would otherwise

" Id. at 17.
92 PRESS RELEASE, The White House, Remarks by President Obama
to the Turkish
Parliament (Apr.
6,
2009)
available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/

thepressoffice/Remarks-By-President-Obama-To-The-Turkish-Parliament.
93

Id.

94

Morelli, supra note 90, at 17.

"Id. at 16-17.

Kuniholm, supra note 3.
Id.
98
Id.
96

97

99

Id. at 35.
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be out of reach.100 Should Turkey join the EU, it would no doubt
become even more westernized, and thereby give the United States an
even stronger ally in the Middle East.101
The United States and the EU have very different goals when
considering the accession of Turkey. 102 The United States believes that
Turkey could be of immense importance on a global scale for
stability.1 03 The EU, by contrast, is more concerned with maintaining its
identity.104 (This is compounded by the EU's distaste for Turkey's
international conflicts, such as with Cyprus, and Turkey's past human
rights abuses.)105
The United States' support for Turkey has caused some
displeasure among members of the EU because the United States has
not directly participated in the EU's history and purportedly does not
fully grasp the importance of allowing Turkey to become a member. 106
Some members also feel that the United States takes too narrow of a
view on the issue, and that couching Turkey's accession in terms of
secularism could mean that anything short of full membership would
be a rejection of Islam entirely by the West.107
The United States has acknowledged that scaling back its
rhetoric in the matter has eased tensions with countries such as France,
Germany and Austria. 108 Some advocates of Turkey's EU membership
believe that the United States should use its influence in more
constructive ways, such as urging Turkey to comply with provisions in
the Additional Protocol. 109 Some members of the United States
Congress continue to offer vocal support for Turkish accession,
although this support will likely have little effect on the outcome of any
negotiations between Turkey and the EU. 110

100 Id

10 1 d. at 26.
102 id. at 35.
103 id
104
105

d. at 28.
Morelli, supra note 90, at 16.
107 Id. at 17.
108 Id. at 3.
106

109 Id. at 17.
110 Id
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In sum, if the United States wishes to advocate on behalf of
Turkish accession, perhaps it will be most effective if it does so from the
sidelines, thereby preserving relations with EU member states.
IV.

TURKEY'S CONSTITUTION AND DEMOCRATIC STATUS

The Economist rated Turkey as a "hybrid regime" in its last
assessment of the state of global democracy.11 1 The Economist
considered many factors in their assessment of democracies, including:
whether national elections are free and fair; the security of voters; the
influence of foreign powers on government; and the capability of the
civil servants to implement policies. 112 Responses were grouped in five
categories: (1) electoral process and pluralism; (2) civil liberties; (3)
functioning of government; (4) political participation; and (5) political
culture. 113 Based on this assessment, Turkey is still in a better position
democratically than many of its neighboring counties in the Middle
East; however, it is in a worse position than many of its neighboring
countries in Europe. 114
Turkey's geological position is evident from the conflicting
values expressed in its constitution. Although Turkey's constitution
contains many "fundamental rights and liberties," the Turkish
constitution also includes significant qualifying language for these
liberties. The government in the past has exploited this language to
violate human rights. 115
In 2010, Turkish voters passed important constitutional
amendments that were aimed at bringing Turkey closer to compliance
with the EU's standards. 116 The original Turkish constitution was
drawn by a military junta that had seized power in the 1980's.117 The
amended constitution provides for: (1) the ability of civilian courts to
n1 Democracy index 2012: Democracy at a standstill, Economist Intelligence Unit, at 6
(March 14, 2013), available at https://portoncv.gov.cv/dhub/porton.por-global.
openfile?p-doc-id=1034.
112
Id. at 26-27.
113 Id.
114 Id. at 10-15.
115 Banani, supra note 22, at
120.
116 Jonathan Head, Turkey backs constitutionalchange, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2010),

availableat http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe- 11278602.
117

Id.
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try military personnel for crimes against the state; (2) more protection
against discrimination for women, children, the elderly and the
disabled; and (3) greater collective bargaining rights. 118 However, some
have called for additional constitutional reforms, particularly in the area
of civil rights. 119 In 2013, Freedom House declared that "civil liberties
[are] at risk in Turkey," citing specifically the fact that Turkey has been
jailing journalists that have spoken out against the government. 120
In theory, Turkey is a liberal democracy. The Preamble to
Turkey's constitution provides that the nation will not "deviate from
liberal democracy and the legal system instituted according to its
requirement." 121 Article 2 of the Turkish Constitution embodies this,
stating:
The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social
state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the
concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice;
respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atattirk,
and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the
Preamble. 122
Furthermore, in direct contrast to many other regimes in the Middle
East, Turkey's Preamble to its Constitution dedicates the country to
secular principles. The Preamble clearly elevates the Turkish identity
over ethnic and religious divisions:
The recognition that no protection shall be accorded to an
activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle
of the indivisibility of the existence of Turkey with its state
and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the
nationalism, principles, reforms and modernism of Atattirk
118Id

Aslan Amani, Turkey's growing constitutionalconundrum, Open Democracy (Mar.
22, 2013), available at https://www.opendemocracy.net/aslan-amani/turkeys-growingconstitutional-conundrum.
120 Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the
Balance, Freedom House, at 3 (Sept. 5, 2013), available at http://www.freedomhouse.
org/sites/default/files/FIW%/"2020130%"20Booklet.pdf.
121 Tfirkiye Cumluriyeti Anayasasi [Const. of the Republic of Turkey] pmbl.
122
Tfirkiye Cumluriyeti Anayasasi [Const. of the Republic of Turkey] art. 2.
119
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and that, as required by the principle of secularism, there
shall be no interference whatsoever by sacred religious
feelings in state affairs and politics; the acknowledgment
that it is the birthright of every Turkish citizen to lead an
honorable life and to develop his or her material and
spiritual assets under the aegis of national culture,
civilization and the rule of law, through the exercise of the
fundamental rights and freedoms set forth in this
Constitution in conformity with the requirements of equality
and social justice.123
Article 5 of the Turkish Constitution embodies this principle by stating,
"[t]he fundamental aims and duties of the state are to safeguard the
independence and integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of
the country, the Republic and democracy..."
Turkey's secularism is declared in Article 24 of its Constitution,
which claims "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of conscience,
religious belief and conviction." 124
In the past, Article 13 has served as the basis for the
government to restrict the liberty of Turkish citizens in a way that
would not be tolerated in most consolidated democracies. However,
since the 2001 amendments to the Turkish Constitution, Article 13 has
been reworded to serve as a guarantee of liberty, rather than a
limitation.125 Article 13 provides that "[f]undamental rights and
freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the
reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without
infringing upon their essence." 126 The only restrictions applied are those
mentioned elsewhere in the Constitution, which is reflected in the
following language: "[t]hese restrictions shall not be in conflict with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the
democratic order of the society and the secular Republic and the
principle of proportionality." 12 7
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Torture and Ill-Treatment of Citizens by Police and Security
Forces

Turkey's constitution does not specifically prohibit cruel and
unusual punishment, although Article 38 provides several different
protections regarding the rights of the accused. 128 Article 38 provides
that " [t]he Administration shall not impose any sanction resulting in
restriction of personal liberty." 129 A similar provision in Article 38 states
that " [p]enalties, and security measures in lieu of penalties, shall be
prescribed only by law."130 Additionally, Article 38 guarantees that
"[f]indings obtained through illegal methods shall not be considered
evidence." 131
There have been several reports that as recently as 2009, the
Turkish court system has accepted evidence received through
torture.132 Accusing the government of being too lax in enforcing its
zero tolerance policy for torture, Anmesty International has stated that
"[n]othing short of a fully-implemented policy of 'zero tolerance for
impunity' will end the spectre of torture, other ill-treatment, killings
and enforced disappearances which blighted Turkey's human rights
record until the very recent past." 133 Although the current government
has enacted laws to prevent torture, Freedom from Torture, a medical
foundation for the care of victims of torture, reported 59 victims from
Turkey in 2012-2013.134 Turkey has failed to prosecute purported
torturers and it has been suggested that torture in Turkey is severely
under-reported because of potential retaliation by the government.135
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Police violence against protesters continues to be a serious
problem.136 In 2012, approximately 4 people were killed during human
rights demonstrations against the government. 137 During clashes with
the Kurdistan Worker's Party ("PKK"),138 a Kurdish terrorist
organization, 17 civilians were killed and 65 were injured. 139
Additionally, in 2011, 34 civilians were killed in an airstrike against the
PKK.140 Furthermore, the police often investigate individuals who
report such violence. 141
B.

Freedom of Expression

Article 26 of the Turkish Constitution guarantees freedom of
expression in Turkey. Article 26 states that "[e]veryone has the right to
express and disseminate his/her thoughts and opinions by speech, in
writing or in pictures or through other media, individually or
collectively." 14 2 However, the rest of article broadly expands the
government's ability to curtail expression. It continues:
The exercise of these freedoms may be restricted for the
purposes of protecting national security, public order and
public safety, the basic characteristics of the Republic and
safeguarding the indivisible integrity of the State with its
territory and nation, preventing crime, punishing offenders,
136
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withholding information duly classified as a state secret,
protecting the reputation and rights and private and family
life of others, or protecting professional secrets as prescribed
by law, or ensuring the proper functioning of the
judiciary. 143
Article 27 guarantees freedom in disseminating science in the arts.144
Article 28 guarantees freedom of the press, stating "[t]he press is free,
and shall not be censored. The establishment of a printing house shall
not be subject to prior permission or the deposit of a financial
guarantee." 145 However, the Article reserves the right of the state to
prevent the publishing of articles that compromise its national
security. 146
In practice, however, freedom of expression has not received
adequate protection under the Turkish Constitution. Turkish law
allows journals to be prosecuted for discussing such subjects as the
government's conflict with Cyprus and governmental abuses of
power,147 and Turkish journalists have been arrested for such crimes as
insulting the armed forces and denigrating Turkishness. 148 Cartoonists
have recently complained about being subjected to censorship over
their portrayals of the President and the Prime Minister. 149 Though a
reform package passed in June 2012 has reduced the potential length of
sentences for imprisoned journalists, these laws fail to live up to the
standards established by the EU.150 As of 2013, Turkey had more
journalists jailed than any other country in the world. 151 Even with
reduced sentences, Turkish journalists still engage in wide selfcensorship for fear of punitive measures. 152
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Nearly all of the major media outlets are owned by
corporations. 153 These corporations have considerable influence over
the content published in the media.154 Many have ties to political
parties,15 and as a result news outlets engage in self-censorship in
order to protect these interests. 156 This is particularly true in the case of
Kurdish language news outlets. 157 Regulation of Kurdish media has
improved through recent legislation, although Kurds are still more
susceptible to regulation by the government than other news sources. 158
The Turkish government similarly curtails free speech on the
Internet. 159 There has been a marked uptick of prosecutions of people
who share content through social networking sites. 160 In 2011, one man
was sentenced to prison for insulting the current Turkish President on
the Internet, 161 and in 2009 the Turkish government blocked access to
YouTube and other websites. 162 In 2011, the government instituted a
new Internet filtering system, intended to allow greater freedom. 163
However, this system apparently still blocks-out innocuous websites,
such as underwear manufacturers. 164 Similarly, academic freedom is
subject to self-censorship. 165 It is estimated that about 3,000 students are
imprisoned after calling for higher education.166
In many cases, Turkish citizens cannot speak-out against the
government without fear of punitive action. 167 In March 2012, Ahmet
$ik and Nedim Sener, two journalists who were investigating human
rights abuses by the Turkish government, were arrested and charged
153
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with membership in a terrorist organization. 168 Their arrests were part
of a criminal investigation of a group that was planning to overthrow
the government. 169 The group's literature is projected to be the main
source of evidence used at trial.170 The Turkish government is
apparently continuing to pursue charges against the men.171
C.

Conscientious Objection

There is no constitutional provision for conscientious objection
in Turkey. Article 72, in fact, seems to directly contradict it. It states,
"[n]ational service is the right and duty of every Turk. The manner in
which this service shall be performed, or considered as performed,
either in the Armed Forces or in public service shall be regulated by

law." 172
In recent years there have been no reforms in Turkey to laws
regarding conscientious objection.173 As of yet, those who have publicly
supported the right to conscientious objection have faced criminal
prosecution. 174 As conscientious objection receives no constitutional
protection, and the government does not appear to be interested in
making significant reforms in this area, conscientious objection is likely
to remain a human rights problem in Turkey. 175
D.

Freedom ofAssembly

Freedom of assembly is addressed in Article 34 of the
Constitution.176 It provides that "[e]veryone has the right to hold
unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without
prior permission." 177 This section, again, has qualifying language. The
168
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freedom of assembly "shall only be restricted by law on the grounds of
national security, and public order, or prevention of crime commitment,
public health and public morals or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others." 178
Despite the constitutional protection for freedom of assembly,
many Turkish citizens have been arrested while peacefully protesting
the government and violent clashes between protesters and police still
occur. 17 9 Though a law passed in 2004 strengthened the freedom of civil
society groups, a law passed in 2005 allows the Turkish government to
restrict the freedom of groups that oppose the government's interests.18 0
In 2012, Ankara banned public rallies of political opponents on the
grounds that the protests sought to "incite anarchy." 181 In the same
year, there were credible allegations that Turkish police abused
demonstrators. 182 Humans Rights Watch has criticized the
government's use of anti-terrorism laws in order to restrict the freedom
of assembly. 183 Also in 2012, the Turkish government placed severe
restrictions on the celebration of the Kurdish holiday, Newroz.184 Once
riots broke out during the celebrations, police used tear gas and water
cannons on the crowd.185 Two people were killed, 178 wounded, 1,014
detained and 206 arrested during the ordeal.186 Even members of local
human rights groups sometimes face threats or prosecution for their
work trying to uphold the fundamental rights of Turkish citizens. 187 In
May 2014, police violently dispersed peaceful protesters in Taksim Gezi
Park.188
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Freedom ofAssociation

Freedom of association is addressed in Article 51, which
provides that:
"[e]mployees and employers have the right to form labor
unions, employers' associations and higher organizations,
without obtaining permission, and they also possess the
right to become a member of a union and to freely withdraw
from membership, in order to safeguard and develop their
economic and social rights and the interests of their
members in their labor relations." 189
Again, the government may curtail this right in the interests of national
security. 190
Despite the constitutional protection afforded to the freedom of
association, in practice the government maintains several harsh
restrictions. 191 Generally, people do not need to notify authorities before
organizing an association. 192 However, citizens do need to notify the
government if the association plans on conducting international
activities or receiving financial support from abroad. 193 Such groups
must provide detailed documentation of these activities. 194 Women's
and LGBT rights groups have complained that they were subjected to
detailed audits and substantial administrative burdens. 195 Though laws,
which protect the formation of labor unions are in place, organized
labor remains limited in practice. 196 In 2010, state employees were first
granted the right to collective bargaining. 197 Regulations on strikes are
burdensome, and the penalties for participating in illegal strikes are
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severe. 198 As recently as 2013, citizens of Turkey have been imprisoned
for, what is essentially, non-violent political association. 199
F.

Rights of Minority Groups and Discrimination

Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution was intended to ensure
the protection of minority groups before the law. 200 Article 10 begins,
"[a]ll individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law,
irrespective of language, race, color, sex, political opinion, philosophical
belief, religion and sect, or any such considerations." 20 1 A separate
provision of Article 10 was intended to protect against discrimination
on the basis of sex. 20 2 It provides that "[m]en and women have equal
rights. The State shall have the obligation to ensure that this equality
exists in practice. Measures taken for this purpose shall not be
interpreted as contrary to the principle of equality." 203
Even though Turkey's amended Constitution professes to give
women equal protection under the law, the World Economic Forum
ranked Turkey 122 out of 135 in the Gender Gap Index. 204 Only onethird of eligible women are a part of the labor force. 205 Furthermore,
women hold just 78 seats in a Parliament consisting of 550 seats. 206
Honor killings still occur, despite stricter laws making them less
permissible. 207
Turkish law prohibits rape, although the government does not
actively enforce the prohibition. 208 Rape is largely underreported due to
embarrassment and potential societal repercussions. 209 Spousal abuse
also remains fairly widespread in Turkey. 210 Like rape, spousal abuse is
prohibited under Turkish law even though the government does not
198
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actively enforce it.211 On March 20, 2012, the Protection of the Family
and Prevention of Violence against Women Law went into place, which
added several important protections for women against violence
during and after marriage. 212 Despite the law, domestic violence
remains a serious problem in Turkey. 213 Honor killings remain a serious
issue, and sometimes young women are pressured by their family to
commit suicide in order to preserve their family's honor. 214
Although discrimination against children was constitutionally
permissible in Turkey, amendments now prohibit positive
discrimination against children. 215 Article 10 of the Turkish Constitution
provides that "[m]easures taken for the protection of children, the
elderly, disabled people, widows and orphans of martyrs as well as for
invalid and veterans would not be considered a violation of the
principle of equality." 216
Turkey has made some major steps towards establishing
human rights in recent years. 217 However, whether Turkey will
continue on this path by establishing additional constitutional reforms
remains to be seen. It is true that even consolidated democracies must
establish some limits on the freedoms of its citizens, but many people
believe that Turkey must create a more healthy balance between the
freedoms of its citizens and state power. 218 Though the human rights
situation in Turkey is apparently improving, there are many areas that
are plainly a cause for concern. This concern has also been the subject of
several key actors dealing directly with Turkish accession. The United
States has raised concerns about Turkey's limitations on the freedom of
expression.219 The European Commission, in its 2011 annual report,
highlighted flaws in Turkey's criminal justice system, Turkey's
restrictions on freedom of expression, and widespread Turkish gender
211
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inequality. 220 In 2010, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human
Rights stated that Turkey's limitations on Turkey's freedom of
expression were "particularly worrying." 221 Turkey must do a better job
at placating the EU's human rights concerns if it wishes to gain full
membership.
Turkey's troublesome past in the area of human rights abuses
seemingly might justify the EU's wait-and-see approach to Turkish
accession. Perhaps other members of the EU are skeptical that Turkey
will indeed comply with their human rights standards for a prolonged
period of time, and so are putting off allowing Turkey membership in
order to see whether they will slide back towards authoritarianism.
Human rights will remain a part of the discussion of Turkey's
membership in the EU until, at least, the conflict in Cyprus is resolved.
V.

CONCLUSION

When one examines the history of Turkey's plight towards
accession into the European Union, it is clear that Turkey has broadly
attempted to comply with EU standards. For example, Turkey made a
substantial step towards accession when it agreed to establish a
customs union. However, Turkey has proved to be uncooperative in the
ongoing Cyprus conflict. Until Turkey finally agrees to some sort of
resolution with Cyprus, long-term holdouts such as Germany are
unlikely to willingly accept Turkey. Even though the United States is a
vocal supporter of Turkish accession, the United States has proved to be
ineffective in placating the EU's doubts.
Though the Turkish Constitution provides facial support for
many crucial liberties to Turkish citizens, the Turkish government is
still unable to comply with the EU's standards for admittance. The
Turkish government has recently attempted to fix some of its
inadequacies in safe-guarding civil liberties, but new laws have not
been strong enough (or rather, have not been strictly enforced). It is
apparent that the Constitution still provides a great deal of "wiggle
room" through which the government can escape compliance. One
potential solution is to draft additional constitutional amendments to
ensure greater protection of human rights in Turkey.
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Whether Turkey will be granted membership in the EU remains
to be seen. Once Turkey is able to resolve its conflict with Cyprus,
Turkey has a much higher likelihood of becoming a member, even if it
still has several outstanding human rights violations. After all, it is easy
to look in from the outside and criticize the situation in Turkey. Almost
every country has certain areas that could be improved with respect to
human rights. One thing is certain though, if Turkey becomes a
member of the EU, the character of international relations will be
forever changed.

